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The objective of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between the busyness of the Board of 
Statutory Auditors’ members and the financial reporting quality. Members of the Board of 
Statutory Auditors are allowed to hold multiple offices in different companies and this raises 
concern on whether or not this affects their monitoring duties. To address this discussion, this 
study analyzes a sample of 93 Italian publicly traded firms in 2018. The busyness of the Board of 
Statutory Auditors’ members is based on their multiple directorships in different firms, while two 
distinct metrics for earnings management are used as proxy to financial reporting quality. The two 
metrics are the abnormal working capital accruals, estimated using the DeFond and Park Model 
(2001), and the discretionary accruals, estimated with the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. 
1995). The effect will be examined by employing a multiple regression model controlling for 
firms’ specific indicators. The data reveal that financial reporting quality is lower when the Board 
of Statutory Auditors’ members are busier. Also, when those members hold multiple offices in 
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The corporate structure of a firm, irrespectively of its industry, consists of different departments 
contributing to the realization of its overall mission and goals. The most common departments 
include Finance, Operations, Marketing, Human Resources and IT. These areas might be more or 
less interdependent, but they are linked together by one common thread, the Accounting & Finance 
division, which records, summarizes and reports to various stakeholders all the financial aspects 
of every department of the firm. Financial Statements are the final result and the main source of 
financial information for most decision makers, as they present the financial position of a firm at 
a point in time and its performance during a fiscal period. Their importance justify why financial 
reporting requires a high emphasis on the accuracy, the reliability and the relevance of the 
information included on Financial Statements. 
 
In order to ensure a high level of accuracy and reliability of financial reporting, it is essential to 
have adequate and efficient internal controls. The term internal controls refers to all the rules, the 
policies and the procedures that a company can adopt to provide reliable financial reporting in 
compliance with local and international laws and regulations. One important element of the 
internal control system in Italian corporations is the Board of Statutory Auditors, which oversees 
the compliance with the law, the respect of the principles of correct administration, and the 
functioning of the administrative, organizational and accounting systems of the firm. 
 
A correct and efficient oversight function is one key element to ensure a good level of quality in 
financial reporting: for this reason, corporate regulators all over the world provide strict rules on 
the individuals in charge of this particular function, both in terms of professional competences 
required and in terms of the total numbers of offices that they can hold in different companies 
during the same period. For example, in the Italian environment, CONSOB sets a limit on the 
cumulative offices for the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members. Although prior literature does 
not agree on whether advantages or disadvantages of multiple directorships prevail, corporate 
regulators around the world often set a limit on the cumulative offices held by boards’ members. 
This study examines multiple directorships of the Board of Statutory Auditors. Being the Board of 
Statutory Auditors a control body of Italian companies only, this study analyzes only Italian listed 
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companies. After accounting for data availability, the final sample includes 93 companies among 
those that were listed at the end of the fiscal year 2018. The first research question that this study 
addresses is whether the multiple directorships of the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members is 
associated with a lower effectiveness on their monitoring duties, as represented by a firm’s 
financial reporting quality. In addition to examining the busyness of a firm’s Board of Statutory 
Auditors, this study also aims at examining the impact of holding multiple roles in other publicly 
traded companies. The analyses are conducted in stages. First, the busyness of the Board of 
Statutory Auditors’ members is analyzed at firm level, according to the numbers of offices held by 
each member of the Board. Then, two different metrics are adopted to measure financial reporting 
quality: abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond and Park model, 2001) and discretionary 
accruals (Modified Jones model, 1995). Finally, the relationship between the busyness of the 
members of the Board of Statutory Auditors and financial reporting quality is estimated through 
an ordinary least square regression.  
 
This study enriches the literature on the busyness and financial reporting quality in multiple ways. 
First, it provides a country-specific context research by analyzing the Italian Board of Statutory 
Auditors and its relationship with the financial reporting quality. Second, by estimating two 
different proxies of earnings management, this study examines the explanatory power of both 
measurement instruments considered in the chosen models, the DeFond and Park model (2001) 
and the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995).  
 
This thesis is composed of five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the first main topic of the study, the 
Board of Statutory Auditors, by describing its importance, its role, its composition and its main 
functions. Chapter 2 summarizes the second relevant topic, the financial reporting quality, by 
reviewing the financial reporting structure and the attributes of quality. Chapter 3 introduces the 
discussion on boards’ members’ multiple directorships and reexamines prior literature on the 
relation between multiple directorships and financial reporting quality. It also describes the context 
of the study and illustrates the research hypotheses developed. Chapter 4 depicts the sample 
selection, the data gathered, the variables, and the estimation method implemented. Chapter 5 
presents the results of the empirical analysis, discusses the findings obtained and introduces 
research limitations, as well suggestions for further researches.
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Chapter 1: The Board of Statutory Auditors 
 
This study aims to investigate the relation between the busyness of board’s members and financial 
reporting quality, by focusing on the Board of Statutory Auditors in Italian listed firms. In order 
to examine this relationship, the busyness of the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors is 
calculated by looking at their numbers of multiple directorships held in different companies, while 
financial reporting quality is estimated using two metrics of earnings management. Chapter 1 
introduces the Board of Statutory Auditors in the Italian system, by describing the role it has in the 
corporate governance structure of a company, as well as the importance, composition and main 
functions of this characteristic internal control body.  
 
 
1.1 The role of corporate governance 
Corporate governance refers to the system implemented to direct and control an organization, to 
align the interests of the directors of a company, the controlling and the minority shareholders, and 
all other stakeholders. Therefore, the corporate governance structure of an entity includes the rules, 
relations, processes and systems adopted to ensure an efficient and fair management of the 
enterprise (Cadbury, 1992). Throughout the years, corporate governance has become one of the 
most discussed issues in the business word. Enormous corporate failures, such as those of Enron, 
WorldCom, and Parmalat, required governments and regulatory authorities to strengthen the 
regulations in order to ensure the normal running of corporate organizations and prevent such 
failures (Al-Baidhani, 2014). Even though the objective of these regulations is the same, laws on 
corporate governance structures and committees may vary from country to country. This study 
focuses on a specific control body of the Italian environment only, the Board of Statutory Auditors 
(Collegio Sindacale), therefore it is necessary to briefly discuss the corporate governance 
structures allowed for Italian joint stock companies to allow a better understanding of the context 
in which the Board of Statutory Auditors operates. 
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1.1.2 Corporate governance systems in Italian S.p.A. 
 
Italian joint stock companies (Società per Azioni) can adopt three different types of corporate 
governance system for their management structure. The systems allowed by the Italian Civil Code 
are: the traditional system, the dualistic system, and the monistic system, and each of them requires 
the shareholders meeting to appoint different boards / bodies according to the governance structure 
in place. The first one, the traditional system (sistema tradizionale), requires the shareholders’ 
meeting to appoint a management body which could be represented by a sole director or a Board 
of Directors, and that will be in charge of the management of the company. The shareholders’ 
meeting appoints also a Board of Statutory Auditors (collegio sindacale), which is responsible for 
overseeing the company’s compliance with the law and company by-laws, the respect of correct 
administration, and the adequacy and the actual functioning of the administrative, organizational 
and accounting systems of the firm, as stated in art. 2403 of the Italian Civil Code. The second 
corporate governance system, the dualistic system (sistema dualistico), is a two-tier system and it 
is regulated by art. 2409 of the Italian Civil Code. The shareholders’ meeting is required to appoint 
a supervisory board (consiglio di sorveglianza) which then appoints a management board 
(consiglio di gestione). While the supervisory board is responsible for overseeing the company’s 
compliance with the law, the management board is responsible for the company’s day-by-day 
management. The third corporate governance system, called monistic system (sistema monistico), 
is a one-tier structure and it requires the shareholders’ meeting to appoint a Board of Directors 
which is in charge of the management of the company. Among its members, the Board of Directors 
is required to appoint a control body (comitato per il controllo sulla gestione). 
 
 
1.2 The Board of Statutory Auditors in the Italian system 
 
The origins of the Board of Statutory Auditors as an internal control body is strictly related to the 
strategical objectives and procedures adopted by a firm when pursuing these goals. The most 
relevant among these targets are those to create profit and provide reliable information to insiders 
and outsiders of the firm. Having accurate and reliable information allows internally to adopt the 
most efficient and effective decisions for the success of the firm, and at the same it ensures a 
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transparent communication to all stakeholders about the effective value of the company in 
economic and financial terms. In addition to this, an important topic is that of compliance: all 
corporations must observe the norms and regulations adopted by the Italian legislation during the 
years within the legal and jurisdictional boundaries in which their activities are performed. It is 
clear that within this framework the firm does not have complete autonomy in the way in which it 
provides financial information to internal and external users. In this scenario takes place the origins 
and the functions of the Board of Statutory Auditors, an internal control body which helps 
controlling and overseeing the business activities. 
 
 
1.2.1 The Board of Statutory Auditors as an internal control body 
 
The Board of Statutory Auditors is considered an internal control body specific of Italian firms 
only (Rizzotti and Greco, 2012). It monitors the adequacy of the internal control systems,  
considering also the size and complexity of the company. An internal control system can be defined 
as the set of directives, procedures, and operating practices adopted by a corporation in order to 
achieve the following objectives: 
- strategic objectives, aimed at ensuring the compliance of management's choices with the 
directives received and with the firm’s mission, as well as guaranteeing the safeguard of the 
company's assets and protecting the interests of the stakeholders; 
- operational objectives, aimed at ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the company's 
operating activities; 
- reporting objectives, aimed at ensuring the reliability of the data; 
- compliance objectives, aimed at ensuring the compliance of the company’s activities with 
laws and regulations. 
An efficient internal control system also facilitates a clear and precise analysis of the main business 
risk factors and improves the efficiency of monitoring management functions (Abbas and Iqbal, 
2012). Therefore, as the Board of Statutory Auditors carries out most of these functions, it is 




1.2.2 Norms and regulations regarding the Board of Statutory Auditors 
 
The norms and the regulations regarding the composition and the functions of the Board of 
Statutory Auditors in the Italian system have been constantly changing over time, since their first 
introduction in the 1970s. During these years, the role of the Board of Statutory Auditors has been 
subject to the continuous changes in the national and international economic environment. The 
structure of the Board of Statutory Auditors, its duties and responsibilities are defined by the Italian 
Civil Code. Such document states that its main activities consist in ensuring that the company acts 
in compliance with the law and the corporate statute, as well as protecting the adequacy of its 
organizational, administrative and financial structure. The Board of Statutory Auditors works 
alongside with the internal control system, ensuring that risks management takes place in 
compliance with the norms and regulations established by the Italian legislation. The legal 
principles are then translated into a set of ethical rules, which supports the entire legal audit activity 
carried out by the Board of Statutory Auditors. These fundamental principles could be summarized 
in independence, integrity, objectivity, competence, diligence, and professionality. 
 
According to the Italian Civil Code, the Board of Statutory Auditors is always mandatory for joint 
stock companies (S.p.A., Società per Azioni) and for partnerships limited by shares (S.a.p.A., 
Società in accomandita per Azioni). For limited liability companies (S.r.l., Società a responsabilità 
limitata), pursuant to art. 2477 of the Civil Code, the Board is mandatory only if at least one of the 
following situations occurs: the company cannot prepare the Financial Statements in the 
abbreviated form because it exceeds the limits set by the Civil Code, the company is obliged to 
prepare the consolidated Financial Statements, or the company controls at least one company 
obliged to perform a statutory audit. In other cases, the Board of Statutory Auditors is optional and 
it can be required by the Constitution of the company. 
 
 
1.2.3 Composition of the Board of Statutory Auditors 
 
According to art. 2397 of the Italian Civil Code, the Board of Statutory Auditors is composed by 
three or five standing auditors plus two additional alternate auditors. The members of the Board 
of Statutory Auditors are appointed by the shareholders’ meeting and the term of office of Statutory 
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Auditors is mandatorily established for three financial years. Also, it is possible that the 
government or other public entities arrange the nomination of the Statutory Auditors. In the event 
of revocation or resignation of a standing Auditor, an alternate takes over in order of seniority, 
while the shareholders' meeting appoints the new Auditor until the established number is restored. 
However, the new Statutory Auditor will remain in office only until the end of the mandate. 
Art. 2399 of the Italian Civil Code lists a number of causes of incompatibility with the Board of 
Statutory Auditors, including relationships of kinship up to the fourth degree, and affinity with the 
directors of the company, with the parent and subsidiary companies, as well as with business and 
work relationships with the same companies. When these situations arise after the nomination of 
the Statutory Auditors, they automatically determine the dismissal of that or those members. In 
addition to the limitations and causes of incompatibility provided by the Italian Civil Code, each 
firm’s Statute may add further restrictions. 
The professional requirements are also extremely important. Art. 2937 of the Italian Civil Code 
establishes that Statutory Auditors can also be shareholders of the company; it also sets subjective 
and professional limits. At least one of the standing Auditors and one alternate must be registered 
in the Register of Certified Auditors and the remaining members who are not registered must be 
chosen among lawyers, chartered accountants, commercial experts, labor consultants, or university 
professors in economic and legal matters. 
 
 
1.2.4 The functions of the Board of Statutory Auditors 
The Board of Statutory Auditors is considered an internal control body within the company’s 
governance system and it is in charge of the control of legitimacy and legality of the direction. 
Specifically, as indicated in art. 2403 of the Italian Civil Code, the Board of Statutory Auditors 
oversees the compliance with the law and with the firm’s by-laws, the respect of the principles of 
correct administration, and the adequacy and the actual functioning of the administrative, 
organizational and accounting systems of the corporation. First, the function related to the 
oversight of the compliance refers to the correct application of the legal and regulatory provisions 
in force and of any other norm contained in the company by-laws. In fact, the Board of Statutory 
Auditors, in the exercise of its activities, is responsible for ensuring and verifying the compliance 
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of the corporate bodies with the law. Second, the oversight of the respect of the principle of correct 
administration refers to verification that the firm’s directors’ decisions are compliant with the 
criteria of economic rationality established by the science of corporate economics. Therefore, the 
Board of Statutory Auditors ensures that directors perform the necessary diligence in fulfilling 
their duties; however, it does not control and judge the directors’ economic decisions, but it only 
examines their legitimacy. Third, the Board of Statutory Auditors verifies that the adequacy and 
the functioning of the firm’s administrative, organizational and accounting systems are adequate 
for the nature and for the size of the firm, as well as for its type of business activities. This type of 
control on the directives and procedures adopted by the company aims at safeguarding the efficient 














Chapter 2: The importance of financial reporting quality 
 
This chapter introduces the concept of financial reporting quality. The first part briefly reviews the 
structure of financial reporting and emphasizes the importance and the purpose of Financial 
Statements. The second part defines the concept of quality and presents its attributes, illustrating 
the fundamental and enhancing qualitative characteristics that financial reports must possess to 
ensure a high level of quality. 
 
 
2.1 Structure of financial reporting 
 
Financial Statements, or Financial Reports, are written records of the financial activities of a 
company and its financial performance. They represent the enterprise’s financial position at the 
end of a fiscal year and the economic result for that period (operating income) in order to monitor 
its performance over time. In addition, they also constitute the starting point for calculating 
taxation. In the Italian context, publicly traded companies are required to adopt International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) which are sets 
of globally accepted accounting standards. IAS 1 states that a firm’s Financial Statement should 
be composed of five different documents: the Statement of Financial Position, the Statement of 
Comprehensive Income, the Statement of Cash Flows, the Statement of Changes in Equity and a 
set of Notes to the Financial Statements. The Statement of Financial Position of a company, also 
called Balance Sheet, at the end of a fiscal period includes the firm’s assets, liabilities and 
shareholders’ equity at that specific point in time. The Statement of Comprehensive Income, or 
Income Statement, or Profit and Loss report, illustrates the economic result of the management for 
a given fiscal period, by analyzing the revenues and the costs incurred during that time. The 
Statement of Changes in Equity shows the total comprehensive income for the period, the effects 
of retrospective applications for each component, and the reconciliation between the amounts at 
the beginning of the year and at the end of the year for each component of the equity. The firm’s 
Cash Flow Statement summarizes all the cash flows that occurred in a given period. This document 
shows all the sources that contributed to increase or decrease the liquidity available for a company 
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in that timeframe. Finally, the Notes to the Financial Statement typically describe in detail some 
of the most relevant items of the Balance Sheet and Income Statement.  
 
 
2.1.1 Purpose of Financial Statements 
 
According to the Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements (IASB, 
2007), the ultimate goal of a firm’s Financial Statements is to provide useful information on the 
financial position, the economic result and the changes in the financial structure of a company to 
a wide range of users who make decisions based on those results. Specifically, users can deploy 
Financial Statements for different purposes, for example: 
- the management of a firm requires reliable Financial Statements to make the best business 
decisions regarding the continued operations. Moreover, the financial analysis that is 
performed on the Financial Statements provides management with an even more detailed 
description of the figures; 
- Financial Statements are used by investors as a basis for their investment decisions. An 
entity’s Financial Statements are at the basis of all valuation models and are systematically 
analyzed by investors and financial analysts in order to estimate the current market value 
of a firm; 
- banks and other lending companies use companies’ Financial Statements to decide whether 
to grant them new funds or to extend debt securities. Moreover, the amount of funds that 
financial institutions are willing to lend is strictly related to the financial position of firms. 
Financial Statements’ users are not limited to the ones mentioned above: also employees, suppliers, 
customers, and other subjects are interested in the financial position of a certain firm for a variety 
of reasons. As many of these users base their decisions on companies’ Financial Statements, 
having reliable and faithful figures constitutes one of the most important elements required. The 




2.2 The financial reporting quality 
 
IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) define a standardized set of rules and 
principles that companies must follow when preparing Financial Statements in countries where 
these accounting standards are adopted. In this way, they ensure uniformity in the financial 
reporting of all businesses adopting IFRS, allowing companies’ Financial Statements to be better 
understood and compared across international boundaries. Following IAS 1, which sets out the 
overall requirements for Financial Statements, a firm’s Financial Statement must depict detailed 
information about the economic performance of that company, as highlighted in the Income 
Statement, its financial position, its cash flows and its changes in equity. IFRS state that any firm’s 
Financial Statements are expected to have the required qualitative attributes such as relevance, 
comparability, timeliness, understandability, faithful representation and verifiability. These 
requirements ensure that the information provided is of high quality. 
 
Financial reporting quality could be defined as the exact manner in which information regarding a 
business activity and its anticipated cash flows are shown, with the aim of informing the 
shareholders about a company’s operations (Verdi, 2006). According to Tang, Chen & Zhijun 
(2008), financial reporting quality refers not only to the manner in which financial information is 
provided, but also to the degree of fairness and accuracy of the information reported. From these 
two definitions, it can be deducted that for Financial Statements to possess high quality 
information, and therefore to provide shareholders and all stakeholders with punctual and reliable 
information about the firm’s current situation, they must be able to provide authentic information 
on the economic performance, the financial position and the cash flows resulting from operations. 
Financial reporting quality could also be defined as the faithfulness of information gathered in the 
financial reporting process (Martinez Ferrero et al., 2015). Following the definition from Martinez 
Ferrero et al. (2015), which focuses mainly on the financial aspect of corporate information, 
Aifuwa and Embele (2019) further expand and modify their definition by describing financial 
reporting quality as the faithfulness of information gathered in both the financial and non-financial 
reporting processes. Therefore, it is mandatory that companies’ financial reports have high quality 
information in order to increase the confidence of users.  
 20 
The next step is to assess how financial reporting quality can be observed and therefore it is 
necessary to analyze both the fundamental and enhancing qualitative characteristics for assessing 
the quality of the financial reporting defined by the International Accounting Standard Board, and 
the concept of earnings quality. 
 
 
2.2.1 Attributes of quality 
According to IASB, the faithfulness of the objectives and the quality of the information disclosed 
in a firm’s financial report is one of the fundamental principles to assess financial reporting quality, 
because one of its main goals is to present transparent information to stakeholders, which can be 
achieved only if high quality is pursued. The Conceptual Framework for financial reporting 
approved by IASB in 2010 sets a list of elements for high quality financial reporting, explaining 
that, to achieve a high level of quality, financial reports must possess both fundamental qualitative 
characteristics and enhancing qualitative characteristics. The former include relevance and faithful 




Relevance is the first fundamental qualitative characteristic and it is often associated to the terms 
materiality and usefulness (Herath and Albarqi, 2017). The term materiality relates to the 
capability of affecting the decisions made by users in their capacity as capital providers; the term 
usefulness underlines the fact that useful information facilitates users to evaluate, correct and 
confirm past and current events. Beest, Braam and Boelens (2009) sustain that one of the highly 
significant indicators of relevance is the fair value, arguing that if an entity uses fair value as a 
basis for measurement, this is an indicator of high level of relevance in that firm’s financial 
reporting information. Another important element that influences the level of relevance is the 
annual reports’ disclosure of forward looking information about the risks and the business 
opportunities, and the feedback provided on how the company has been affected by major market 
events (Beest, Braam and Boelens, 2009). 
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Faithful Representation 
Another qualitative characteristic that should be reflected in financial reports is the faithfulness of 
the information. The Conceptual Framework of Financial Reporting (IASB, 2010) gives a clear 
definition for the concept of faithfulness representation: a firm’s Financial Statements must reflect 
and represent to the maximum extent possible neutral, complete and free from error financial 
information. Faithful representation of the financials of a company is at the basis of the usefulness 
of the Financial Statements (Herath and Albarqi, 20173); therefore, it is expected that financial 
reports should provide reliable representation of the economic situation of the entity, and nothing 
else. 
Verifiability 
Verifiability is one of the four enhancing qualitative characteristics for financial reporting defined 
by the Conceptual Framework (IASB, 2010). Financial information is classified as verifiable when 
it faithfully represents the economic situation of a business. In particular, it should be possible for 
independent observers to reproduce exactly the same financial results given the same facts and 
assumptions. For example, external auditors of a firm, considering the same set of financial records 
used by the company, should be able to build the same Financial Statements results. Another 
important element needed to achieve verifiability is the knowledge of the assumptions 
implemented by a business in constructing its Financial Statements. For example, the calculation 
of the depreciation expenses by a third party could easily vary from the expenses estimated by a 
company, as it relies on the projected useful life and salvage value of the assets. To sum up, 
verifiable Financial Statements assure their users that they fairly represent the business 
transactions of that entity. 
Comparability 
Comparability refers to the concept of allowing users to compare Financial Statements across time 
and among different companies in the same period. According to Cheung et al. (2010), 
comparability is possible only if identical events are reflected by identical accounting facts and 
figures in different Financial Statements. To preserve the comparison among different Financial 
Statements, any changes in the accounting policies and any implications resulting from these 
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changes should be disclosed and explained in the Notes at the end of the financial reports. Beest, 
Braam and Boelens (2009) sustain that providing financial index numbers and ratios in a firm’s 
Financial Statement helps the comparison with other organizations. 
Understandability 
Understandability is another essential element of quality of financial reporting. It refers to the 
concept that financial information should be easily comprehended by users who have a reasonable 
knowledge of business and economic activities (The Conceptual Framework for Financial 
Reporting, 2010).  According to Cheung et al. (2010), this can only be achieved through effective 
communication of the financial data: information that is clearly and sufficiently presented and 
classified results in a higher quality. 
Timeliness 
The last enhancing qualitative characteristic of financial reporting is timeliness. Herath and 
Albarqi (2017) explain that financial information must be available before it loses its usefulness 
to decision makers. In fact, according to Almosa et al. (2007), timeliness in financial reporting is 
considered vital and a significant factor influencing the usefulness of the financial information 
available to external users. Moreover, timely financial reporting is not only necessary for a 
decision maker, but also for a healthy financial market. An efficient and timely allocation of the 
resources could be achieved by reducing the asymmetry of information (Kamran, 2003). To 
summarize, all prior literatures agrees on the fact that there is a negative relationship between the 
value of the information reported in the Financial Statements and its timeliness (Mc Gee et al., 
2013). 
 
2.2.2 Earnings quality  
As introduced before, users of Financial Statements are always pursuing high quality financial 
information and this could derive from a high level of earnings quality, which is also known as 
one of the most relevant indicators of capital market efficiency (Herath and Albarqi, 2017). Even 
though the meaning of earnings quality seems to be very straightforward, as it refers to the quality 
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of the earnings reported in a firm’s Financial Statements, the concept behind this term has been at 
the center of accountants’ discussions for many years. It is clear that earnings quality is a very 
important concept; however, there are many definitions and none of them is universally accepted 
(Holt, 2013). For example, Knechel et al. (2007) defines earnings quality as the reasonableness of 
reported earnings, while Den Besten et al. (2015) refers to earnings quality as the ability of the 
reported earnings to predict a firm’s future earnings.  There is no unanimous agreement also on 
the metrics adopted to proxy earnings quality: prior literature adopted different metrics, such as 
abnormal accruals and accruals quality, timeliness, smoothness, predictability, persistence and 
earning variability (Ewert and Wagenhofer, 2011). One concept on earnings quality is undebated: 
a high level of accuracy and precision should result in high accounting quality (Herath and Albarqi, 
2017). 
 
2.2.3 Financial reporting quality vs earnings quality 
Even though the concepts of financial reporting quality and earnings quality are substantially 
different, they are still tightly connected and, in the context of earnings management, the two 
concepts are used as substitutes (Herath and Albarqi, 2017).  
Table 2.1 in the next page shows the proxies used in prior literature to measure the financial 
reporting quality versus the ones of the reported outcome indicated by the CFA (Chartered 
Financial Analyst) Institute, a non-profit global organization of investment professionals that 
offers a wide range of programs and professional training to set a high set of standards for 
investment professionals. As stated by the CFA Institute, the proxies for financial reporting quality 
represent the reliability of the financial data, while the proxies for earnings quality refer directly 







Financial reporting quality vs reported outcome quality 
Financial Reporting Quality Quality of Reported Outcome 
- Decision – useful information 
- Faithful representation of economic 
reality 
- Compliance with standards 
- Sustainable activity 
- Adequate returns 
- Higher company’s value 
Source: CFA Institute  
Moreover, it can be easily proved that these two concepts are complementary, since a minimum 
level of financial reporting quality is required to correctly assess the earnings quality and an 
improvement on the level of the reporting quality will allow financial reporting’s users to easily 
assess the earnings quality. The relation between these two concepts can be summarized in the 
table below. 
Table 2.2 
The relation between financial reporting and earnings quality  
  Financial Reporting Quality 




LOW financial reporting quality 
impedes assessment of earnings 
quality and valuation 
HIGH financial reporting quality 
enables assessment 
LOW earnings quality decreases 
company value 
High 
HIGH earnings quality increases 
company value 
HIGH financial reporting quality 
enables assessment of earnings 
quality and valuation 
Source: CFA Institute  
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Clearly, there is a positive correlation between financial reporting quality and earnings quality. In 



















Chapter 3: Literature review, context and hypothesis development 
 
 
The previous chapters illustrated the two main topics of this study, the Board of Statutory Auditors 
and the financial reporting quality. This chapter first introduces the problem of boards’ members’ 
multiple directorships, then it reviews prior academic literature on this topic and its relationships 
with financial reporting quality. Furthermore, some information will be provided about the context 
of this research, the Italian environment, by illustrating specific CONSOB regulations regarding 
multiple directorships of the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors in Italian listed firms. 
Finally, the hypotheses tested will be explained in detail in the final part of the chapter. 
 
 
3.1 An overview on the problem of multiple directorships 
After introducing the Board of Statutory Auditors and its main characteristics and analyzing the 
concept of financial reporting quality, it is necessary to address another topic in order to fully 
understand the objective of this study. The corporate governance consequence of multiple 
directorships represents a widely discussed issue worldwide, both in the business and in the 
academic environments. Several institutions and shareholder groups expressed concern that 
busyness could result in boards’ members who are too busy to perform their monitoring functions 
effectively (Zheng, 2008). For example, in the United States, the National Association of 
Corporate Directors guidelines (NACD 1996) advise that senior corporate executives and CEOs 
should not hold more than three offices in outside companies, and the Council of Institutional 
Investors (CII 1998) recommends that board members should serve at maximum on three different 
boards. Similarly, in the UK the Combined Code (2004) sets a limit on the numbers of offices for 
executives and non-executives directorships. In the Italian context, CONSOB, with “Regolamento 
Emittenti”, limits the number of offices that board members can hold. In contrast, some companies 
supported the multiple directorships of their board members, because it helps improving 
governance effectiveness. For example, in 2004 Brown Forman, one of the largest American 
owned company in the wine business, wrote in their annual report that the fact that one member 
of the audit committee was holding more than three roles in other companies enhanced his ability 
in his tasks.  
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There is also a widely discussed academic debate on the consequences of multiple directorships. 
Prior researches provide contrasting ideas on the effects of the busyness of corporate boards’ 
members. On one hand, following an agency theory perspective, some researchers argue that 
boards with a high level of busyness are associated with ineffective monitoring due to insufficient 
time and effort committed (e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2006 and Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). 
On the other hand, others sustain that multiple directorships of board members are beneficial to 
shareholders (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983 and Vafeas, 2005). Based on a labor market perspective, 
board members with multiple offices tend to be more diligent in performing their duties, because 
of a larger human capital at stake. Moreover, holding offices in different companies adds valuable 
experiences and increases their knowledge. Therefore, the effect of multiple directorships on the 
board’s governance effectiveness has not reached a consensus, as both advantages and 
disadvantages are recognized.  
 
 
3.1.1 Competences vs busyness 
 
There are many characteristics of the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors that could affect 
their work effectiveness. In fact, prior literature contains plenty of studies analyzing the effect of 
those characteristics on the financial reporting quality. There is no doubt that members of the Board 
of Statutory Auditors possess the competences requested in order to succeed in their role of 
supervision. This is because, as mentioned before, for an individual to be appointed as a Statutory 
Auditor, he / she must fulfill certain professional requirements set by the Italian Civil Code, as for 
example being registered to the Register of Certified Auditors or other professional Register or 
being a university professor of economics or law. However, many studies addressed the issue on 
the relation of the financial reporting quality with the competences of the directors and the Audit 
Committees’ members, such as their financial expertise, their tenure, etc. The main purpose of all 
these studies was not to discuss whether these figures possess enough competences, but they aimed 
at analyzing whether a higher level of competences reflects in a higher financial reporting quality. 
In addition to the individual competences, the busyness of the members has been at the center of 
several studies. Specifically, many researchers investigated whether the multiple directorships of 
the Audit Committee’s members could affect their ability. However, as it will be widely illustrated 
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in the next chapter, there is no unanimous decision on the effect of busyness on financial reporting 
quality. Several studies support the idea that holding multiple directorships may reduce the work 
effectiveness of the board members; on the contrary, other studies sustain that holding offices in 
different companies enhances board members’ ability and knowledge. 
 
 
3.2 Literature review  
 
Due to the novelty of this study, which focuses on the members of a specific internal control body 
of Italian firms only, namely the Board of Statutory Auditors, it is not possible to find prior studies 
with the same exact interests. Nevertheless, prior literature provides various researches that 
analyze the busyness of directors and of Audit Committees’ members, and their relation with firm 
performance and financial reporting quality. As per Rizzotti and Greco (2012), in the Italian 
corporate governance system there is no Audit Committee; however, some of its functions are 
carried out by the Board of Statutory Auditors. Therefore, for the sake of this study, it is reasonable 
to look at previous researches regarding multiple directorships and the Audit Committee, because 
of its similarity with the Italian Board of Statutory Auditors. 
The final goal for both bodies is to ensure that companies provide transparent and reliable 
information to outsiders. Internationally, the Audit Committee’s role is to assist the Board of 
Directors to satisfy its corporate governance and overseeing responsibility related to the firm’s 
financial reporting, risk management system, internal control system and internal and external 
audit functions. Specific norms and requirements for the Audit Committee vary country by 
country; however, there are some universalities for Audit Committees across different governance 
structures. Specifically, the European Union, national legislations and national governance codes 
often define legal requirements for boards and Audit Committees which are mandatory (EY, 
European Corporate Governance 2019). For example, these requirements could regulate board 
members’ independence, their multiple directorships in different companies or set academic and 
professional requirements for auditors. While these specific requirements, the responsibilities of 
the Audit Committees and how they work could vary among different countries, some functions 
can be considered as the standard role of an Audit Committee, regardless of the structure. Such 
general functions refer to: supervising internal controls and risk management process, managing 
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the external audit process and monitoring company accounts to oversee the financial reporting 
process.  
 
3.2.1 Directors’ busyness and firm value 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that this study looks at the relation between busyness and financial 
reporting quality, it is important to briefly discuss the contexts of prior researches related to the 
busyness of directors and members of a firm. Many of these works looked at the busyness of 
directors and firm value. 
 
The problem with holding multiple board seats has been at the center of academic research for a 
long time, expanding from the empirical evidence on the reasons of multiple directorships 
(O’Sullivan et al. 2005; O’Sullivan et al., 2009) to the consequences of such busyness on various 
financial matters (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). Overall, the documentation on the relation between 
the busyness of boards’ directors and the firm value offers different perspectives and findings. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) showed that directors’ ability is compensated with additional board 
appointments. Supporting this idea, Ferris et al. (2003) proved that the directors whose firms 
perform better are more likely to participate to more board seats in the future. Similarly, Ferris et 
al. (2003), as well as Brown and Maloney (1999), demonstrated that there is a positive correlation 
between directors with multiple board seats and stock returns. Therefore, these results advocate a 
positive relation between the busyness of directors and firms’ performance. 
On the contrary, other researchers suggested that holding multiple board seats reduces the ability 
of the directors of advising and monitoring the firms efficiently. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) found 
that firms where the majority of outside directors hold multiple roles in different companies are 
associated with weaker corporate governance and worse performance. Another study of the same 
authors also documented a positive announcement return whenever a busy director leaves the 
board.  
Overall, whether a busy board may improve the performance of the firm or worsen its effectiveness 
remains an open question for debate. Both views have empirical support in the literature and are 
intuitively appealing. Moreover, Cashman (2012), after analyzing previous literature with the aim 
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of understanding to what are attributable such differences in the results, found that the inclusion 
or exclusion of smaller firms in the sample impacts the inferences drawn regarding busy directors.  
 
 
3.2.2 Audit Committee busyness and financial reporting quality 
 
The relationship between the characteristics of an Audit Committee, such as its independence and 
financial expertise, and financial reporting quality has been at the core of academic research for a 
few decades (e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983, Yang and Krishnan, 2005, and Tanyi et al., 2015). 
Moreover, in recent years, it has become more and more important to examine other aspects of 
boards’ members and internal committees, such as the busyness of these members, with particular 
attention to multiple directorships in other offices and the relationship with the quality of the 
financial reporting. 
According to Uniamikogbo et al. (2014), two fundamental existing theories support the idea that 
Audit Committee’s multiple directorship can affect financial reporting quality. On one hand, 
agency theory suggests that members of the Audit Committee with a high level of busyness might 
be subject to time constraints and work overload, which could adversely affect the financial 
reporting quality of the firm audited. On the other hand, labor market theory implies that Audit 
Committee members with a high level of busyness might work in a more diligent way, thanks to 
their reputation and their willingness to share their experience and knowledge, which increases 
firm performance and financial reporting quality.  
 
A significant number of studies show the benefits deriving from holding additional directorships. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) noted that the reputation of directors as efficient monitors for a firm 
increases with additional directorship, thus supporting the idea that busy directors may be more 
capable than their counterparts. Yang and Krishnan (2005) showed that earnings management 
seems lower for firms whose Audit Committee’s directors hold multiple board seats.  
On the contrary, several studies do not support the beneficial impact of additional directorships on 
earnings quality, arguing that board monitoring requires substantial time and effort (Beasley, 
1996). Miwa et al. (2000) also found a strong negative relationship between multiple directorships 
of the Boards’ members and financial reporting quality. Contrarily to Yang and Krishnan (2005), 
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Dhaliwal et al. (2010) found that members of Audit Committees with higher directorships are 
associated with more earnings management. Furthermore, other studies demonstrated the existence 
significant relations between the Chairman of the Audit Committee and financial reporting quality. 
Zheng (2008) did not find a positive relation between multiple directorships of the Audit 
Committee as a whole and financial reporting quality; however, he proved that the multiple 
directorships of the Chairmen are significantly positively associated with financial reporting 
quality. On the opposite, Tanyi et al. (2015), in investigating how the number of Audit Committee 
Chair positions held by the Chairman affects financial reporting quality, found that there is a 
negative relation between the number of such leadership positions held by the Chairman and the 
firms’ financial reporting quality.  
 
Overall, prior literature does not provide univocal support to either of the two theories: it is still 
uncertain whether busyness helps improving directors’ efficiency and accuracy or it is detrimental. 
Therefore, given the different positions, this study seeks to further examine the effects of the 
busyness on financial reporting quality by looking at the relationship between multiple 
directorships of the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors in Italian listed firms and financial 
reporting quality.  
 
 
3.2.3 Regulating multiple directorships 
 
The problem with holding multiple board seats is not only at the center of academic research, but 
it is also a major concern for corporate governance regulators. A common view among these 
institutional bodies is that holding multiple board seats can result in over-stretched directors 
reducing their ability of monitoring and advising the firms effectively. In Italy, “Regolamento 
Emittenti” by CONSOB regulates and limits the number of offices that any member of any internal 
control body can hold. Similarly, in the UK and in the USA, the Combined Code (2003) and the 
National Association of Corporate Directors (1994) respectively provide guidelines and 
suggestions on the number of executives and non-executives directorships that could be held in 
other listed companies. Although in recent years these types of regulations have increased in 
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general, the holding of various directorships by non-executive board members is still highly 
unregulated around the world (Ghafran, 2013). 
 
 
3.3 Context of Analysis 
 
The sample of companies in this study includes only Italian listed firms and considers an internal 
control body typical of the Italian environment only, the Board of Statutory Auditors. Therefore, 
it is necessary to review the regulations regarding the offices held by the members of this Board 
before going into the details of the research.  
 
 
3.3.1 The role of CONSOB 
 
CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa), the National Commission for 
Companies and the Stock Exchange, is the Italian body regulating and overseeing investors’ 
protection, efficiency, transparency and development of the Italian securities market. It is an 
independent administrative authority with independent legal capacity and full operational 
autonomy, established with the law of June 7th, 1974, nr. 216. CONSOB carries out many different 
functions. The most important could be summarized as follow: 
- regulate the provision of investment services, the disclosure obligations of listed companies 
and the public offerings of financial products; 
- authorize the publication of prospectuses relating to public sale offers and offer documents 
relating to public purchase offers, the exercise of regulated markets, and registration in the 
sector registers; 
- oversee market management companies’ operations and transparency, and orderly conduct 
of negotiations; 
- penalize supervised entities if necessary, directly or by making a proposal to the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance; 
- check the information provided to the market by listed companies and by those who 
promote offers of financial instruments to the public, as well as the information contained 
in the financial documents of listed companies; 
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- ascertain any anomalous trends in trading of listed securities and perform any other act of 
verification of violations of the rules on market manipulation, abuse of privileged 
information (insider trading) and manipulation. 
 
 
3.3.2 The “Regolamento Emittenti” 
 
The Issuers’ Regulation (Regolamento Emittenti), which was introduced in May 14th, 1999, 
contains all the regulations aimed to direct the discipline of the issuers. 
The Regulation is divided into four parts: the first one is dedicated to regulatory sources and 
additions. The second part, called "Appeal to Public Savings", regulates the public offer and trade 
for subscription (Offerta Pubblica di Sottoscrizione) of financial instruments and the public 
purchase offer or exchange (Offerta Pubblica di Acquisto and Offerta Pubblica di Scambio). The 
third section, called "Issuers", regulates multiple aspects: the admission to trading on regulated 
markets of European financial instruments and units or shares of collective investment savings 
bodies, corporate information, ownership structures, uses of voting rights, the protection of 
minorities, the administration and control bodies, the audit, and finally the subjects who have 
access to privileged information. The fourth and last part is related to transitional and final 
provisions. 
The Issuers Regulation also includes eight attachments: 
(i) Annex 1 - Offer to the public for the subscription and / or sale of financial instruments 
and admission to trading community financial instruments 
(ii) Annex 2 - Public purchase and / or exchange offers 
(iii) Annex 3 - Company information 
(iv) Annex 4 - Ownership structures 
(v) Annex 5 - Delegation of voting rights 
(vi) Annex 5-bis - Calculation of the limit on the accumulation of offices 
(vii) Annex 5-ter - Audit engagements 




3.3.3 CONSOB regulations on board members’ multiple directorships 
 
Some articles of “Regolamento Emittenti” are strictly connected with this study because they are 
related to the limitations to the cumulation of offices by the members of any control body, therefore 
also of the Board of Statutory Auditors. For example, as anticipated in the above paragraph, 
CONSOB establishes a limit on the cumulations of offices estimated with a particular weighting 
system, and it also establishes all the information that board members are required to immediately 
communicate to CONSOB. 
 
Art. 144 – terdecies: limits on the cumulation of offices 
 
The first article somehow connected to this research is art. 144 – terdecies. This article helps 
regulating the limits on the cumulative positions held by the members of internal control bodies. 
In general, if a member holds the same position in five different issuers, he / she cannot hold the 
same position in any additional issuer. Moreover, the total number of administrative or control 
positions that a member of the control body of an issuer can hold must be less or equal to a limit 
corresponding to six points resulting from the application of the calculation model showed in Table 















Table 3.2  
CONSOB weighting system 
 
Source: CONSOB Annex 5-bis, Model 1 
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In this table, the column “Weighting” indicates the individual value of each role, measured by 
considering the time commitment required for that role, the type of role per se, and the 
characteristics of the company in which that role is held. The reason for attributing different 
weights for different type of firms, i.e. listed versus not listed, is based on the fact that different 
types of roles held in different kinds of companies require more or less time commitment.  
 
 
Art. 144 – quaterdecies: disclosure obligation to CONSOB 
 
Art. 144 – quaterdecies defines all the information that CONSOB requires in terms of offices held 
by the members of an internal control body. In general, every director or member who holds the 
office of member of control body in more than one issuer shall inform CONSOB with any relevant 
change in current offices or changes in their personal details, including the size of the company in 
which the office is held. As a consequence, CONSOB always possesses the current information 
about members of the Board of Statutory Auditors. 
 
 
Art. 144 – quinquiesdecies: public disclosure of the information 
 
Art. 144 – quinquiesdecies states that CONSOB must publish on its website all the latest 
information acquired following to Art. 144 – quaterdecies, on behalf of the members of the 
supervisory bodies of companies. This specific article of the CONSOB regulations allowed to 
retrieve all the information required by this study regarding the numbers and the types of offices 
held by the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors of the firms in the sample. 
 
 
3.4 Hypotheses development and discussion 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between multiple directorships of Board of Statutory 
Auditors’ members and financial reporting quality. The research includes in total three different 
hypotheses. In doing so, an analysis of multiple directorships at the Board of Statutory Auditors 
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level for each firm included in the sample has been performed. The first hypothesis investigates 
the relationship between multiple directorships of the Board of Statutory Auditors and financial 
reporting quality. The second and third hypotheses focus on the roles held in other listed companies 
only: the second one analyzes the effect of holding two or more roles in listed companies and 
financial reporting quality; the third one examines the effect on financial reporting quality of Board 
of Statutory Auditors’ Chairmen, when they hold two or more offices in other listed companies. 
 
 
3.4.1. The effect of Board of Statutory Auditors members’ multiple  directorships on  financial   
reporting quality 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Board of Statutory Auditors oversees the compliance 
with the law, the respect of the principles of correct administration, and the adequacy and the actual 
functioning of the administrative, organizational and accounting systems of the firm (art. 2403 of 
the Italian Civil Code). Costs and benefits deriving from multiple directorships do not lead to a 
unanimous opinion in the literature on whether there is a positive or negative effect of multiple 
directorships and financial reporting quality. A Board of Statutory Auditors’ member with 
numerous offices in other companies might contribute to its effective functioning as he / she might 
bring more experience (knowledge transfer effect) and has stronger incentives to monitor because 
of his / her higher reputational capital at stake (labor market effect). On the other hand, a Board of 
Statutory Auditors’ member with several offices in other companies might be overcommitted and 
therefore contributes less time and effort to its service in each firm, negatively affecting financial 
reporting quality. This study, following Lopez and Peters (2012), hypothesizes that financial 
reporting quality is lower when members in charge of overseeing financial reporting hold several 
offices in different firms. Consequently, the expectation is a negative relationship between the 
busyness of the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members and financial reporting quality. The first 
hypothesis that will be tested is: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the number of roles held by members of the Board of Statutory Auditors, 
the lower the firm’s financial reporting quality. 
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3.4.2. The impact of holding multiple roles in publicly traded firms 
 
While the first hypothesis analyzes the effect of multiple directorships of the Board of Statutory 
Auditors’ members on financial reporting quality, assuming that all offices require the same level 
of attention and time commitment, the second hypothesis of this thesis focuses on the members 
who hold multiple offices in publicly traded firms. As mentioned in the previous section of this 
chapter, art. 144 – terdecies of CONSOB regulation establishes for Italian companies a limit on 
the cumulative positions held by the members of internal control bodies. The total number of 
administrative or control positions that a member of the control body of an issuer can hold must 
be less or equal to a limit corresponding to six points resulting from the application of the 
calculation model showed in the Annex 5-bis, Model 1 (page 34). In this model CONSOB 
differentiates the roles held in public firms from the roles held in private firms, as well as those 
held in large – medium companies and small ones, by assigning a “weight” to each role depending 
on the characteristics of the entity where the role is held. Following the same reasoning, this study 
analyzes the effect of the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members who hold multiple roles in 
publicly traded firms versus those who do not. The second hypothesis that will be tested is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: If two or more members of the Board of Statutory Auditors hold two or more roles 
in listed companies, the firm’s financial reporting quality is lower. 
 
 
3.4.3. The impact of Chairman’s multiple directorships in publicly traded firms  
 
The third and last hypothesis that will be tested in this research focuses on the multiple 
directorships of Chairmen of the Board of Statutory Auditors. Tanyi and Smith (2015) investigated 
how the number of Audit Committee Chair positions held by the Chairman affects financial 
reporting quality. They found that there is a negative relation between the two. However, this thesis 
does not focus on the total number of offices held by the Board of Statutory Auditors’ Chairmen; 
instead, following the logic behind the second hypothesis, it investigates the possible effect on 
financial reporting quality of the multiple directorships of Chairmen in listed firms only. The third 
hypothesis that will be tested is the following: 
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Hypothesis 3: If the Chairman of the Board of Statutory Auditors holds two or more roles in listed 
companies, the firm’s financial reporting quality is lower. 
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Chapter 4: Research design: sample selection, variables and 
estimation method 
 
The empirical analysis aims at testing the hypotheses developed: specifically, it examines the 
relationship between the number of roles held by the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members in 
Italian listed companies with particular emphasis on those auditors appointed in more than one 
entity. The first part of this chapter is dedicated to the sample considered for the study and it 
includes a description of all the variables required for the analysis, as well as comments on the 
sample’s values for these variables. The second part of the chapter introduces the estimation 
method that will be implemented in this study. 
 
 
4.1 Sample selection 
 
The analysis has been conducted by looking at Italian companies listed on the Milan Stock 
Exchange; in fact, boards’ members of Italian listed corporations are obliged to communicate to 
CONSOB the number of positions held in other companies, both listed and not-listed. The search 
query considers Italian listed firms in the fiscal year 2018, to which a series of criteria has been 
applied for the extraction of the final sample. At the end of the 2018 fiscal year, 314 unique firms 
were listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. Financial institutions (insurance companies, banks, etc.) 
have been excluded from this sample because their Financial Statements differ significantly from 
those of companies operating in regular production and services sectors. Financial institutions 
produce untypical accounting record and have substantially different working capital structures 
(Klein, 2002). Furthermore, all entities whose historical data were missing have also not been 
considered. Last, the companies whose members of Board of Statutory Auditors were modified 
between fiscal years 2018 and 2020 have been excluded from the sample. The necessity of 
applying such criteria derives from the fact that CONSOB only publishes information on the 
current members of the Boards of Statutory Auditors, whose mandate lasts for three fiscal years. 
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The application of these selection criteria eventually led to a sample of 93 unique firms with an 
average market capitalization of € 2.63 billion. The final results of the sampling procedure are 
reported in Table 4.1 
 
Table 4. 1 









The data was collected from three different origins:  
(1) Standard and Poor’s Compustat database, to access Annual Financial Statements; 
(2) firms’ annual reports on corporate governance and ownership structure, to manually collect 
information on the number of roles held by each member of the Board of Statutory 
Auditors; 
(3) CONSOB website, to retrieve the number of roles that Statutory Auditors hold in other 
public firms. 
 
The pie chart in the next page, illustrates a summary of the industry of all the firms included in the 
sample. For each firm, the corresponding sector has been categorized by translating each SIC code 
(Standard Industrial Classification) into the twelve industries classified by Fama and French. The 
sample clearly represent the whole industry classification provided by the Milan Stock Exchange. 
The only industry not represented in the sample is the one of financial firms, due to the constrains 
that have been made in the selection of the sample. The most represented industries in the sample 
are: manufacturers, durable consumer goods and non-durable consumers good.  
 
 
Research Criteria Search Result 
Italian listed Companies that are active in 2018 314 
Elimination of financial companies 231 
Incomplete data in Compustat 143 
Inconsistent data on Board of Statutory Auditors 93 
Final Sample 93 
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Figure 4.2: 





4.2 Variables measurement 
 
4.2.1 Measures of earnings quality 
 
In this model, earnings quality is considered a proxy of financial reporting quality of the firms 
included in the sample. Previous studies have identified numerous features of earnings quality, 
among which accruals, smoothness, investor responsiveness, restatements (Dechow and Schrand, 
2004). However, prior literature does not suggest that there is a unique best proxy for earnings 
quality (Perotti and Wagenhofer, 2014). The next part of this chapter analyzes the proxies for 
































Dechow et al. (2010) refers to earnings persistence as the ability of a firm to maintain a certain 
level of profits over time, which constitutes a clear indicator of income quality. Moreover, such 
property appears to be particularly useful for company valuation. In fact, if an enterprise shows 
persistent earnings, then its current profit is a very reliable predictor of future performance. 
A common specification of earnings persistence is described as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠  𝑡+1 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑡 + 𝜀 𝑡  
 
where 𝛽 measures persistence.  
 
The positive relation implies that more persistent earnings are associated with higher earnings 
quality. Research has shown that the main determinant of this property is accruals, defined as the 
difference between profits and the Statement of Cash Flows’ result. Indeed, earnings are more 
persistent when they consist predominantly of cash flows, rather than accruals. Other studies 
demonstrated that also easily readable financial reports and strong management guidance are 
correlated with higher persistence of earnings.  
Therefore, persistence represents a positive signal of earnings quality, as it provides a reliable 
estimate of future cash flows, which constitutes a necessary input for company valuation.  
 
 
Abnormal accruals  
 
Accounting accruals are revenues earned or expenses incurred for which cash has not yet changed 
hands. These adjustments are usually made before Financial Statements are issued and they have 
an impact on a company’s net profit, by affecting both its Balance Sheet and Income Statement. 
While “normal accruals” are required to properly represent a firm’s performance within a specific 
year, “abnormal accruals” refer to unusual or discretionary accruals booked with the intention of 
manipulating earnings. Therefore, they are an important element to consider when measuring 
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earnings quality. Many models have been developed to identify those accruals that constitute a 








Jones (1991) Acct =  + 1Revt + 2PPEt + t  
Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) Acct =  + 1(Revt - Rect) + 2PPEt + t 
Performance matched  
(Kothari et al., 2005) DisAcct – Matched firm’s DisAcct 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) approach WC =  + 1CFOt-1 + 2CFOt + t 
Discretionary estimation errors  
(Francis et al., 2005) 
TCAt =  + 1CFOt-1 + 2CFOt + 3CFOt+1 + 
4Revt + 5PPEt + t  
 =  + Sizet + 2(CFO)t + 3(Rev)t + 
4log(OperCycle)t + 5NegEarnt + t 
 
 
Abnormal accruals are estimated as the residuals from these regression models. Jones (1991) 
describes the accrual process as a function of sales growth and investment in Property, Plant and 
Equipment, commonly considered as drivers of a company’s value. Dechow et al. (1995) proposed 
a modification of Jones’ model, by taking into consideration growth in credit sales. Kothari et al. 
(2005) introduced a further improvement to the Jones’ regression, by adding an independent 
variable to control for performance. This model compares a firm’s abnormal accruals with those 
of a company in the same industry sector and same year with a similar Return On Assets. Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) approached the topic from a different perspective: they defined accruals as a 
function of cash flows (past, current and future), because accruals are booked to account for future 
payments and cash collections. They found a correlation between smaller, weaker firms and lower 
accrual quality. Francis et al. (2005) reviewed Dechow and Dichev’s regression by including 
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revenue growth and Property, Plant and Equipment in order to control for performance and 
depreciation respectively. 
Researchers have also analyzed the existence of a relation between abnormal accruals and earnings 
persistence, obtaining some interesting findings. For example, large accruals usually require more 
forecasts, which are likely to be reversed in future periods, generating a discontinuity in earnings. 
Regardless of this correlation, it is evident that accruals play an important role in determining the 





Earnings smoothing refers to lowering the fluctuations in firms’ earnings. Researchers recognized 
that earnings smoothness makes earnings more informative about performance than cash flows. 
One question that the literature addresses is whether smoothness could be considered as an 
indicator of quality. Most of the studies supporting this concept are those that used cross-country 
data and analyzed the change in the consequences of country-level instead of firm-level measures 
of smoothness. However, the relation between smoothness and earnings quality remains arguable, 
as there is no common conclusion on whether earnings smoothness could be considered as 
indication of quality. 
 
 
Asymmetric timeliness and timely loss recognition 
 
Timely recognition of earnings is another measure that has been associated to earnings quality. 
Asymmetric timeliness is a property of accounting earnings that recognizes good news on a less 
timely basis than bad news. The model introduced by Basu (1997) it is the most frequently used 
to measure timely loss recognition from the following reverse earnings-return regression: 
 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡+1 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽0𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
𝐷𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑡 < 0 
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This model presumes that losses in returns (Ret) are efficiently reflected by the markets when such 
losses are incurred.  
 
Basu (1997) provides also a second measure of timely loss recognition, which is not based on 
returns: 
 
∆𝑁𝐼𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 +  𝛼2∆𝑁𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛼3(𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 ∗ ∆𝑁𝐼𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡 
 
where 𝑁𝐸𝐺𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑡−1 is a dummy variable equal to one if 𝛼2∆𝑁𝐼𝑡−1 is negative. 
 
Loss recognition is timelier for firms that use International Accounting Standards (Barth et al. 
2008) and in common law rather than code law countries (Ball et al. 2000). Overall, timely loss 
recognition is positively related to investor protection and it is higher only for firms audited by the 





Target beating of earnings, also referred to as benchmarking, consists in analyzing small positive 
differences between reported earnings and any benchmark as a measure of earnings quality. Hayn 
(1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) have documented a “kink” in the distribution of 
reported earnings around zero. According to their findings, earnings measures, such as small 
profits and small loss avoidance, have been recognized as an indication of earnings management. 
However, there are still some contradictory evidence that provides several important caveats to 
this general conclusion (Dechow et al. 2010). 
 
 
Earnings quality measures 
 
As explained before, there is no unanimous agreement in earnings quality measures. In this study, 
two distinct metrics from the literature have been deployed: 
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(i) Abnormal Working Capital Accruals, estimated using the DeFond and Park (2001) 
model, which is particularly suitable when the number of observations in the sample is 
limited, as in this case; 
(ii) the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al’, 1995), which is the Jones model (1991) 
adjusted for growth in credit receivables. 
 
 
DeFond and Park model 
 
The first earnings quality metrics is Abnormal Working Capital Accruals (AWCA). The definition 
proposed by DeFond and Park (2001) is the following: 
 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗  (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 / 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is the revenues and 𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡  is the level of non-cash working capital observed in year t 
for firm I, scaled by the beginning total assets determined as follows: 
 
𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  (𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡) −  (𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑖,𝑡) 
 
where CA is current assets, Cash is cash and short-term investments, CL is current liabilities, and 
D is short-term debt. The second term of the first equation represents the predicted value of 
working capital, calculated as working capital in the previous year (𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1) and adjusted for the 
change in sales. 
 
 
Modified Jones model 
 
The second measurement considered is the Modified Jones Model. Following the equation 
















𝑇𝐴𝑡 = Total accruals in year 𝑡 divided by total assets in year 𝑡 − 1, 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑡 = Revenues in year 𝑡 less revenues in year 𝑡 − 1, 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑡  = Delta revenues in year 𝑡 less delta net receivables in year 𝑡 − 1, 
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡  = Gross property plant and equipment in year 𝑡, 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑡−1 = Total assets in year 𝑡 − 1, 
 𝛼1, 𝛽2, and 𝛽3 = Parameters to be estimated, 
𝜀𝑡 = Residuals in year 𝑡. 
 
 
Total accruals are defined as follows: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  (Δ𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡) − (Δ𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 −  Δ𝐷𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡) − Δ𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 
 
 
The discretionary accruals are calculated by measuring the non-discretionary accruals as a portion 
of the total accruals in the Modified Jones model (1995). The residuals from the regression 
estimated in the first equation are used as proxy for discretionary accruals, while the regression 
excluding residuals represents non-discretionary accruals that can be computed as: 
 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are the residuals estimated in the first equation. 
 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑡 = Change in current assets in year 𝑡, 
∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ = Change in cash and cash equivalents in year 𝑡, 
∆𝐶𝐿𝑡 = Change in current liabilities in year 𝑡, 
∆𝐷𝐶𝐿𝑡 = Change in short-term debt included in current liabilities in year 𝑡, 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡 = Depreciation and amortization expense in year 𝑡. 
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In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, both measures of financial reporting quality 
adopted in this study, the abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond and Park model, 2001) and 
the discretionary accruals (Modified Jones model, 1995), will be multiplied by  -1. Tariverdi et al. 




4.2.2 Busyness and multiple memberships 
 
The main idea of this thesis is based on the assumption that the busyness of Statutory Auditors 
affects financial reporting quality. The first measure taken into consideration because of its impact 
on earnings quality is the average number of roles held by the members of the Board of Statutory 
Auditors (BUSYNESS). Those numbers have been gathered manually from firms’ reports on 
corporate governance and ownership structure for the fiscal year 2018 under the section dedicated 
to the Board of Statutory Auditors. The second and third variables identified to measure the 
busyness of the Board of Statutory Auditors look at the type of roles held by Statutory Auditors, 
by distinguishing between the roles held in other public or private firms. As previously mentioned, 
this classification was possible because the plurality of roles in listed firms must be communicated 
to CONSOB. The objective of the second variable (BUSY_BSA) is to measure the interaction effect 
between the variable BUSYNESS and the type of roles the members held. This dummy variable 
takes the values of: 
 
(1) if two or more members of the Board of Statutory Auditors hold two or more roles in other 
publicly traded firms; 
(0) otherwise. 
 
The third variable used to measure the busyness of the Board of Statutory Auditors is the number 
of roles held in other listed firms by the Chairman of the Board (BUSY_CHAIR). The purpose is 
to measure the interaction effect between the variable BUSYNESS and the type of roles the 
Chairman of the Board holds. The dummy variable BUSY_CHAIR takes the values of: 
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Evidence in literature supports the idea that the busyness and workload of Auditors does affect 
financial reporting quality. Tanyi et al. (2015) investigated how the number of Audit Committee 
Chairs’ positions affects their ability to oversee a company’s financial reporting process. They 




4.2.3 Control variables 
 
A common drawback of this kind of studies relates to the unfeasibility to include all the relevant 
variables and theoretical links in the regression model. The effects of these elements have been 
taken into consideration with the inclusion of four control variables: firm size (SIZE), leverage 
(LEV), sales growth (GROWTH) and profitability (ROA). 
The first control variable, SIZE, was calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. Prior studies 
consistently include firm size as control variable while studying the effects on earnings quality 
(Badolato et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2011). It is argued that smaller firms are more likely to engage 
in earnings management activities and that larger firms have more developed internal control 
systems (Ali and Zhang, 2015). The second control variable is leverage (LEV) and it was estimated 
as total debt over total assets. Leverage is included in this kind of studies to ensure that outside 
factors related to debt, such as debt commitments, are minimized (Farouk and Hassan, 2014; Lin 
et al’, 2006). Moreover, prior studies found that firm leverage and external financing are related 
to earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; DeAngelo et al., 1994). Following the model 
presented in Hamberg et al. (2011), ROA was included as a control variable to account for the 
performance of the firms in the sample. It was calculated as net income lagged by total assets. The 
last control variable in the model is GROWTH, which is the annual percentage change in revenues. 
Doukakis (2014) argues that high growth firms are more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings 
management. 
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4.2.4 Variables overview 
 





Label Description Measured as 
   
Dependent   
   
AWCA DeFond and Park 𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 / 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1) 
DACC Modified Jones 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1(Δ𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡 
   
Independent   
   
BUSYNESS Roles held Average number of roles held by the member of the 
BSA 
BUSY_BSA (0,1) Roles held Dummy variable equals to “1” if at least two members 




Roles held Dummy variable equals to “1” if the Chairman of the 
BSA holds two or more roles in listed companies, “0” 
otherwise 
Controls   
   
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets 
GROWTH Sales growth Annual percentage change in revenue 
LEV Firm leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets 
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4.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics provides basic features of the sample data. The descriptive statistics of the 
dependent earnings management variables, independent busyness variables and control variables 
are all presented in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 
Descriptive statistics of the variables considered 
 
 
N Mean SD Min  Median  Max 
       
EM Metrics 
      
       
|AWCA| 93 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.26 
|DACC| 93 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.23 
AWCA 93 0.00 0.05 -0.24 0.00 0.26 
DACC 93 -0.01 0.05 -0.16 -0.01 0.23 
       
Independent Variables 
    
       
BUSYNESS 93 9 7 1 8 47 
BUSY_BSA 93 0.28 0.45 0 0 1 
BUSY_CHAIR 93 0.43 0.50 0 0 1 
       
Control Variables 
      
       
SIZE 93 6.88 1.93 2.52 6.84 12.02 
 53 
GROWTH 93 0.13 0.67 -0.56 0.06 6.31 
LEV 93 0.61 0.15 0.22 0.61 0.92 
ROA 93 0.05 0.06 -0.17 0.03 0.35 
 
It is important to make some relevant considerations regarding the descriptive statistics represented 
in this table. The mean absolute value of accruals is 0.4% of total assets for both earnings 
management metrics calculated in this study. The mean of the variable BUSYNESS shows that the 
average number of roles held by Statutory Auditors per firm is 9. The variable BUSY_BSA indicates 
whether two or more members of a Board of Statutory Auditors hold two or more roles in other 
Italian listed companies. In this sample, the mean value indicates that 28% of the boards in the 
sample are composed by two or more members who hold roles in other listed firms, while the mean 
value of the variable BUSY_CHAIR demonstrates that 45% of the Boards’ Chairmen hold two or 
more roles in other listed companies. The means of LEV and GROWTH are respectively 0.61 and 
13%. The average ROA for the firms in the sample is 5%, which is commonly considered an 
adequate value.  
 
 
4.4 Estimation method 
 
Most previous researches applied regressions models to estimate the effects of one or more 
independent variables on earnings management (Lin and Hwang, 2010). The regression model 
generally had the following form: 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋1,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2,𝑡 + . . . + 𝜀𝑥,𝑡 
 
where EM is a measure for financial reporting quality, X represents either an independent variable 
or a control variable, and t represents a point in time. 
The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between multiple directorships of Board 
of Statutory Auditors’ members and financial reporting quality, where financial reporting quality 
is measured as proxy of earnings quality: abnormal accruals, estimated with DeFond and Park 
(2001) model, and discretionary accruals, estimated with the Modified Jones (1995) model. The 
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independent variable in the first hypothesis represents the average number of roles held by the 
firms’ Board of Statutory Auditors’ members, and the corresponding statistical analysis is 
performed by estimating the coefficients in the following regression model: 
 
H1: 𝐸𝑀𝑖 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑩𝑼𝑺𝒀𝑵𝑬𝑺𝑺𝒊 + β2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖  + β3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖  +  β4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖  +  β5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖  +  ε  
 
where EM is measured as abnormal accruals and discretionary accruals. BUSYNESS is the average 
number of roles held by the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors. SIZE represents the 
natural log of the total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year. LEV is the ration between total 
debt and total assets. ROA, which is the annual return on assets, corresponds to net income divided 
by lagged total assets. GROWTH represents the annual percentage change in revenues. 
 
The second and third hypotheses focus primarily on the interaction terms between the two 
independent variables included in the model. The first variable is BUSYNESS, which indicates the 
average number of roles held by the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members in other firms. The 
second and third variables, respectively for the second and third hypothesis, are BUSY_BSA and  
BUSY_CHAIR, which are two dummy variables based on the multiple offices held only in publicly 
traded firms.  
 
The regression models for the second and third hypotheses are: 
 
H2: 𝐸𝑀𝑖 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌_𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3( 𝑩𝑼𝑺𝒀𝑵𝑬𝑺𝑺𝒊 ∗ 𝑩𝑼𝑺𝒀_𝑩𝑺𝑨𝒊  
) +
 β4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖  + β5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖  +  β6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖  +  β7𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖  +  ε 
and 
H3: 𝐸𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖  + 𝛽2𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3( 𝑩𝑼𝑺𝒀𝑵𝑬𝑺𝑺𝒊  ∗
𝑩𝑼𝑺𝒀_𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑰𝑹𝒊 ) + β4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖  + β5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖  +  β6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖  +  β7𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖  +  ε 
where EM is measured as abnormal accruals and discretionary accruals. BUSYNESS is the average 
number of roles held by the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors. BUSY_BSA is a dummy 
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variable for multiple directorships in listed companies. BUSY_CHAIR is a dummy variable for 
chairmen’s multiple directorships in listed companies. SIZE represents the natural log of the total 
assets at the end of the previous fiscal year. LEV is the ration between total debt and total assets. 
ROA, which is the annual return on assets, corresponds to net income divided by lagged total assets. 
GROWTH represents the annual percentage change in revenues. 
It is interesting to analyze the interaction term between these variables because it is assumed that 
holding an office in a public company requires more time commitment than in a private entity. An 
interaction between two variables occurs when an independent variable has a different effect on 
the outcome depending on the values of another independent variable. Therefore, the interaction 
term shows whether a change in the second independent variable affects the result of the first 
independent variable. In this regression model, the interaction terms in the second and third 
hypotheses indicate whether holding two or more roles in listed companies only affects financial 
reporting quality.
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Chapter 5: Presentation of the results and comments 
 
The previous chapter described the sample selected for this study, the estimation model and all the 
variables selected; this chapter aims to present the results derived from the empirical analyses. The 
first part is dedicated to the results obtained from the three hypotheses, while the second part 
provides a summary of the results, its theoretical implications and limitations, and also some 
directions for future studies. 
 
 
5.1 Hypotheses testing 
 
The aim of this study is to analyze the relationship between multiple directorships of Board of 
Statutory Auditors’ members and financial reporting quality. As mentioned in the last part of the 
third chapter, this research includes in total three different hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
investigates the relationship between multiple directorships of the Board of Statutory Auditors and 
financial reporting quality. The second and third hypotheses focus on the roles held in other listed 
companies only and their influence on the busyness of the Board of Statutory Auditors and 
financial reporting quality. The second one analyzes the effect of the Board of Statutory Auditors’ 
members’ multiple directorships in listed companies and financial reporting quality. The third 
hypothesis examines the effect of the Board of Statutory Auditors’ Chairmen’s multiple 
directorships on financial reporting quality. 
 
 
5.1.1 H1: Busyness of Board of Statutory Auditors and financial reporting quality 
 
The first hypothesis investigates the relationship between multiple directorships of the Board of 
Statutory Auditors and financial reporting quality. Following prior studies, the expectation is a 
negative relationship between the multiple directorships of the Board of Statutory Auditors’ 
members and financial reporting quality, measured as proxies of earnings quality. 
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H1: The higher the number of roles held by members of the Board of Statutory Auditors, the lower 
the financial reporting quality of the audited firm. 
The estimated regression model is the following: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖 =  𝛼0 +  𝛽1𝑩𝑼𝑺𝒀𝑵𝑬𝑺𝑺𝒊
 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖  + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖  + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖  
Table 4.1 shows the coefficients estimated from the regression of two measures of earnings quality 
(|AWCA|, and |DACC|) on multiple directorships of Board of Statutory Auditors’ members 
(BUSYNESS) plus control variables for the listed firms in the sample and their respective p-values. 




Empirical results for H1  
 
Variables |AWCA|  |DACC| 
     
BUSYNESS -0.001**  -0.001*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
    
SIZE 0.004  0.004* 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
ROA 0.079  0.087 
 (0.068)  (0.063) 
LEV 0.002  0.033 
 (0.028)  (0.026) 
GROWTH -0.017**  -0.001 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
     
# Observations 93  93 
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Adjusted R-square 10.80%  14.59% 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
As expected, the results of the analysis show a negative relation between the busyness of the Board 
of Statutory Auditors’ members (BUSYNESS) and the financial reporting quality for both earnings 
management metrics (AWCA and DACC), therefore indicating a negative relationship between 
multiple directorships and financial reporting quality (Wee Kheng Soon, 2011). Both results 
delivered through the DeFond and Park model (2001) and the Modified Jones model (1995) are 
statistically significant.  
 
 
5.1.2 H2: The impact of holding multiple offices in publicly traded firms 
 
The second hypothesis focuses on the roles held in other listed companies by the members of the 
Board of Statutory Auditors. It analyzes the effect of holding two or more roles in listed companies 
on the financial reporting quality of the audited firm. The objects of attention in this hypothesis 
are the interaction terms between the two independent variables included in the model, BUSYNESS 
and BUSY_BSA. The interaction terms help explaining the interactions between two or more 
independent variables. Again, the expectation is a negative relationship between multiple 
directorships in listed companies and financial reporting quality. 
H2: If two or more members of the Board of Statutory Auditors hold two or more roles in listed 
company, the financial reporting quality is lower. 
The estimated regression model is the following: 
𝐸𝑀𝑖 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌_𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3( 𝑩𝑼𝑺𝒀𝑵𝑬𝑺𝑺𝒊 ∗ 𝑩𝑼𝑺𝒀_𝑩𝑺𝑨 𝒊 )
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖  + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖  +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖 
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Table 4.1 shows the coefficients estimated from the regression on two measures of earnings quality 
(|AWCA|, and |DACC|) on multiple directorships of Board of Statutory Auditors’ members 
(BUSYNESS) plus control variables for the listed firms in the sample and their respective p-values. 




Empirical results for H2  
 
Variables |AWCA|  |DACC| 
     
BUSYNESS -0.001  -0.001* 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
BUSY_BSA -0.002  -0.001 
 (0.018)  (0.017) 
BUSYNESS*BUSY_BSA -0.003**  -0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.001) 
    
SIZE 0.006***  0.005** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
ROA 0.041  0.068 
 (0.064)  (0.063) 
LEV 0.006  0.035 
 (0.026)  (0.025) 
GROWTH -0.016***  0.001 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
     
# Observations 93  93 
Adjusted R-square 24.49%  12.53% 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The results of the analysis show a negative relation between both measures of financial reporting 
quality and both BUSYNESS and BUSY_BSA. In addition, the interaction terms between the two 
independent variables included in the model, BUSYNESS and BUSY_BSA, are found to be positive, 
therefore suggesting that multiple directorships in listed companies have a negative effect on 
financial reporting quality. The result delivered through the DeFond and Park model (2001) is 
significant, while the result derived from the Modified Jones model (1995) is not significant.  
It is not surprising that the first model provides significant result, because the adjusted R-square 
in H2 has substantially increased (24.49%) with respect to the adjusted R-square in H1 (10.80%), 
while in the second model it has slightly decreased (12.53% from 14.59%). Looking at the values 
of the adjusted R-square is very important, as an increase on its value means that the new terms 
included in the model improve the model fit more than would be expected by chance. Also, the 
coefficient of determination, R-square, is the measure of goodness of fit most extensively used in 
regression models (Kvalseth, 1985). 
 
 
5.1.3 H3: The impact of the Chairmen’s multiple directorships in publicly traded firms 
 
The third hypothesis focuses on the roles held in other listed companies by the Chairmen of the 
Board of Statutory Auditors. It analyzes the effect of holding two or more roles in listed companies 
on the financial reporting quality of the audited firm. The object of attention in this hypothesis is 
the interaction term between the two independent variables included in the model, BUSYNESS 
and BUSY_CHAIR. The expectation for the interaction term is to be negative, as it indicates that 
the effect of holding multiple directorships on financial reporting quality is higher when the 
Chairman holds two or more roles in listed companies.    
 
H3: If the Chairman of the Board of Statutory Auditors holds two or more roles in listed company, 






The estimated regression model is the following: 
 
𝐸𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌𝑁𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑈𝑆𝑌_𝐶𝐻𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3( 𝑩𝑼𝑺𝒀𝑵𝑬𝑺𝑺𝒊 ∗ 𝑩𝑼𝑺𝒀_𝑪𝑯𝑨𝑰𝑹𝒊 )
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖  + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖  +  𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖 
 
Table 4.1 shows the coefficients estimated from the regression on two measures of earnings quality 
(|AWCA|, and |DACC|) on multiple directorships of Board of Statutory Auditors’ members 
(BUSYNESS) plus control variables for the listed firms in the sample and their respective p-values. 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Table 5.3 
Empirical results for H3  
 
Variables |AWCA|  |DACC| 
     
BUSYNESS -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
BUSY_CHAIR 0.015  0.011 
 (0.014)  (0.014) 
BUSYNESS*BUSY_CHAIR -0.003**  -0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
    
SIZE 0.005**  0.004* 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
ROA 0.096  0.095 
 (0.065)  (0.063) 
LEV -0.004  0.030 
 (0.027)  (0.026) 
GROWTH -0.017***  0.001 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
     
# Observations 93  93 
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Adjusted R-square 18.95%  10.74% 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
The results of the analysis show a negative relation between the absolute value of earnings quality 
and the busyness of the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members (BUSYNESS). Also the relation 
between BUSY_CHAIR and financial reporting quality results to be negative, suggesting that if the 
Chairman of the Board holds two or more roles in listed companies, financial reporting quality is 
lower. The interaction term between the two independent variables (BUSYNESS and 
BUSY_CHAIR) in the model results to be negative, therefore suggesting that the effect of holding 
multiple directorships on financial reporting quality is higher when the Chairman holds two or 
more roles in listed companies. The result delivered through the DeFond and Park model (2001) 
is significant, while the result derived from the Modified Jones model (1995) is not significant. 
Regarding the fitness of the models, also in H3, the first model is the one that provides significant 
results and where the adjusted R-square has substantially increased (18.95%) with respect to the 
adjusted R-square in H1 (10.80%), while in the second model it has slightly decreased (10.74% 
from 14.59%).  
 
 
5.2 Summary of findings 
This study examines the effect of Board of Statutory Auditors’ busyness on financial reporting 
quality of Italian listed firms. The busyness of Board of Statutory Auditors’ members is measured 
as the number of offices held in other companies, listed and not listed. Earnings management has 
been considered as metric for financial reporting quality, and it has been proxied by firms’ 
abnormal working capital accruals calculated with DeFond and Park model (2001) and 
discretionary accruals estimated with the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). This 
relationship is examined by drawing a sample of 93 entities listed on the Milan Stock Exchange in 
2018. Consistent with prior literature (Lin and Hwang, 2010), a multiple linear regression model 
is employed using the ordinary least squares method.  
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The first hypothesis investigates the relationship between multiple directorships of the Board of 
Statutory Auditors’ members and financial reporting quality and states that firms with busier Board 
of Statutory Auditors have lower financial reporting quality. Table 5.1 (p. 57) shows the results of 
the analysis. The expectation was proved to be correct. Both measures of earnings management 
(|AWCA| and |DACC|) show a significant positive relationship with the busyness of the Board of 
Statutory Auditors’ members and suggest a negative impact on financial reporting quality, as a 
higher level of earnings management implies a lower financial reporting quality (Manzano and 
Conesa, 2014). These results are consistent with prior researches supporting the idea that multiple 
directorships affect the time commitment and the quality of the work (labor market theory).  
 
The second and third hypotheses focus only on the roles held by the Board of Statutory Auditors’ 
members in other listed companies. The second one analyzes the effect of holding two or more 
roles in listed companies and financial reporting quality. Table 5.2 (p. 59) shows the results of the 
analysis. The interaction term between the two independent variables in the model has been 
included in this second hypothesis and it is the center of the analysis. The results of the regression 
show a positive interaction term between the two independent variables included in the model: the 
average number of roles held by the members of the Board of Statutory Auditors (BUSYNESS), 
and the dummy variable which indicates if two or more members of the Board held two or more 
roles in listed company (BUSY_BSA). This result indicates that the effect of holding multiple 
directorships on financial reporting quality is higher when those roles are held also in listed 
companies. Both metrics of earnings management led to a positive coefficient; however, only the 
result with the abnormal working capital accruals proved to be significant. 
 
The third and last hypothesis investigates the effect on financial reporting quality of Board of 
Statutory Auditors’ Chairmen only, holding two or more offices in other listed companies. Table 
5.3 (p. 61) shows the results of the analysis. Also in the third hypothesis, the interaction term has 
been included. The results of the regression show a positive interaction term between the two 
independent variables included in the model: the average number of roles held by the members of 
the Board of Statutory Auditors (BUSYNESS), and the dummy variable which indicates if the 
chairman of the Board held two or more roles in listed company(BUSY_CHAIR). This result 
indicates that the effect of holding multiple directorships on financial reporting quality is higher 
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when the Chairman holds two or more roles in listed companies. Both metrics of earnings 
management lead to a positive coefficient; however, only the results with the abnormal working 
capital accruals proved to be significant. These findings are consistent with other studies which 
analyzed only the Chairmen of the Audit Committees. Zheng (2008) did not find a positive relation 
between multiple directorships of the whole Audit Committee and financial reporting quality; 
however, he found a significant positive association between the multiple directorships of the 
Chairman and financial reporting quality.  
 
 
5.3 Theoretical implications 
 
This study provides valuable insights to the current available literature on multiple directorships 
and financial reporting quality, especially for the Italian context, where studies on the Board of 
Statutory Auditors appear to be scarce.  
This research enriches the current literature in multiple ways. 
First, by employing a country-specific context research for financial reporting quality and multiple 
directorships, this study contributes to the existing literature providing an analysis on the Italian 
environment only. As discussed in chapter two, prior literature provides numerous studies on the 
effect of characteristics and busyness of the Audit Committee’s members and financial reporting 
quality. However, studies on the Italian firms’ Board of Statutory Auditors are not easy to find.  
Second, by employing different proxies of earnings management, it investigates the explanatory 
power of each specific measurement instrument considered in the models, DeFond and Park (2001) 
and Modified Jones (1995). The choice on the best proxies of earnings management has been 
widely discussed in the past and it is still at the center of current researches.  
The final results show consistency with prior studies of various researchers. Dhaliwal et al. (2010) 
found that members of Audit Committees with higher directorships are associated with more 
earnings management. Moreover, Zheng (2008) reports a significant positive association between 





5.4 Research limitations 
 
Notwithstanding that the results of this research provide some valuable insights, it is important to 
address some of its caveats. Limitations in the study derive from the choice of the dependent 
variable and the controls variables included in the sample, as well as the limited size of the sample. 
First and foremost, the accuracy of the discretionary accrual models has been highly debated (i.e. 
Dechow et al., 1995 and Kothari et al., 2005), mainly because proxies of earnings management by 
abnormal working capital accruals or discretionary accruals remains an estimation. Despite the 
accuracy and reliability of the models being scientifically proven, results should always be treated 
with caution. Managers could engage in different earnings management practices rather than 
accruals-based earnings management (Doukakis, 2014). This study considers only accruals 
earnings management as measure of financial reporting quality and therefore may not be fully 
representative. 
Second, the Italian context of this study limits the applicability of the results. As widely discussed 
in Chapter 1, the Board of Statutory Auditors is an internal control body present only in the Italian 
context. Therefore, even considering its similarity with the Audit Committee, the results of this 
study might not be applicable to the situation in other countries. 
Third, the effect of the SIZE variable has been consistently significant, whilst other tested variables 
remain insignificant most of the time. This might indicate that this control variable distorts the rest 
of the analysis. However, the inclusion of firm size is consistent with many other prior studies and 
is hard to neglect and simply exclude from the research. 
In addition to the three limitations exposed in this section, it is also relevant to consider that the 
choice of control variables might influences the results (Doukakis, 2014). Although numerous 
effects have been controlled for with control variables, there might be other incentives that affect 
financial reporting quality. For example, Klein (2002) and Cornett et al. (2009) discovered that 
there is a negative relation between board independence and financial reporting quality using 







5.5 Directions for further research 
 
The findings and limitations introduced several areas for future research. Although the findings do 
not prove to be significant with both earnings management proxies, the empirical results still 
provide for some implications about where future research can start from. 
First, in this study, financial reporting quality has been considered to measure the quality of the 
supervisory work provided by the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members. However, other 
researches could look at additional metrics to measures the effectiveness and the quality of their 
work in the audited firms. 
Second, the earnings managements’ proxies that have been considered in this study focused on the 
accrual-based earnings management: other proxies of real earnings management, such as 
timeliness, might have different results.  
Third, the busyness of the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members has been measured by simply 
counting the number of roles held by those members in listed and non-listed firms. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, CONSOB regulates the limits on the cumulative positions held by the members of 
the internal control bodies, and sets the limit for the total number of administrative or control 
positions to be less or equal to six points resulting from the application of the calculation model 
showed in the Annex 5-bis (p. 35). If possible, it would be interesting to replicate a similar analysis 
using those scores as measure of the busyness of the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members.  
Finally, this research focuses on a relatively small sample including only listed firms. However, 
even though it is not mandatory to all private firms, the Board of Statutory Auditors’ is required 
for some limited liability companies and it is optional for all other private companies. Future 
research could also include those entities in the sample and therefore amplify the sample size as 












A firm’s Financial Statements, or Financial Report, represent an indispensable tool for managers 
in order to make the best business decision, as well for investors in order to evaluate their 
investment decisions. These two groups of users are not the only ones interested in the financial 
position of a certain firm: in fact, Financial Statements are one important source of information for 
various stakeholders, such as shareholders, banks and other lending companies, employees, 
suppliers, etc. An entity’s Financial Report outlines its economic situation and its financial 
performances during that particular fiscal period, and having reliable, faithful and precise figures 
is one of the most important element required. The usefulness and precision of financial data are 
commonly referred to as the quality of the financial reporting (Downen, 2014). 
 
Academic researches, in general, have always tried to investigate and analyze what can affect, both 
in a positive and negative way, the financial reporting quality. More specifically, academic studies 
often examine board members’ characteristics and their relationships with the quality on the 
financial reports. It is very common that researchers do not agree unanimously on whether a certain 
characteristic of the board positively or negatively affects financial reporting quality. For example, 
one topic at the center of these discussions regards the busyness of the board members: while on 
one hand some studies show that a high level of busyness is associated with lower financial 
reporting because it reduces their effectiveness on performing their duties, on the other hand others 
argue that multiple directorships increase board members’ knowledge, experience and ability, 
resulting in a higher level of quality on financial reports. 
 
This study aimed to further investigate these relationships and it examined the relationships 
between the busyness of the Bord of Statutory Auditors’ members and financial reporting quality 
by analyzing a sample of Italian publicly traded firms. The first chapter introduced the Italian 
corporate governance structures for joint stock companies (S.p.A.) and illustrated the role and the 
functions of the Board of Statutory Auditors, a characteristic internal control body of the traditional 
system. The second chapter summarized the concept financial reporting quality, by reviewing the 
financial reporting structure and the attributes of quality. The first part of the third chapter reviewed 
prior literature regarding the concept of multiple directorships at the board level. Then, after 
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providing an overview on the context of the analysis and the role of CONSOB, it introduced and 
discussed the hypotheses implemented in the study. The first hypothesis focused on the number of 
offices held by the Board of Statutory Auditors’ members, while the second and the third 
hypotheses aimed to study the impact of holding multiple offices in other publicly traded 
companies. The forth chapter further explained the context of the study, by describing the sample 
and all the variables considered for the analyses. The last chapter presented the results of the 
regressions and offered some interesting insights to discuss about. 
 
The first hypothesis, which investigated the relationship between multiple directorships of the 
Board of Statutory Auditors’ members and financial reporting quality, showed that firms with 
busier Board of Statutory Auditors have lower financial reporting quality. In addition, the second 
and the third hypotheses, which focused on the effect of multiple directorships in listed companies 
and financial reporting quality, showed that holding two or more offices in other publicly traded 
companies increase the negative effect of busyness on financial reporting quality.  
 
This study enriches the current literature in multiple ways. It further investigates the relationship 
between the busyness of the board members and the financial reporting quality and, at the same 
time, by applying a country-specific context research, it contributes to the literature on the Board 
of Statutory Auditors which seems hard to find. Also, by employing different measures of earnings 
management, it investigates the explanatory power of each specific metric. Nonetheless, this study 
presents also some limitations. There is no unanimous agreement among prior researches on which 
is the best measure for financial reporting quality, and neither on the best proxies for earnings 
management; therefore, as this study considers only accruals earnings management as measure of 
financial reporting quality, it may not be fully representative. Moreover, the Board of Statutory 
Auditors is an internal control body present only in the Italian context and, for this reason, the 
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